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Abstract
The problems related to the integration of the unmanned aerial vehicles into national airspaces is one of the main topics that the 
scientific researchers are dealing with these days. Despite that, none of them are investigating the UAVs from the surveillance point of 
view. For that reason, highlighting the problems that have to be dealt with and assessing them through a holistic approach is the aim 
of the paper. Therefore, the paper takes the different stakeholders view and identify the key factors that have to be taken into account. 
The authors propose the surveillance technologies that can be considered and evaluated them along the revealed factors through a 
global view. The results can be applied as a base for the further research in UAVs surveillance domain.
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1 Introduction
Over the last couple of years, due to the rapid develop-
ment of technology and ease of use, airspace users such 
as unmanned aerial vehicles have spread widely. Devices 
initially used only for military purposes, nowadays are 
also commercially available to civilians without the 
need for any pre-qualification. In subsequent years the 
unmanned aircraft traffic is expected to grow at an accel-
erated rate as more and more businesses recognize the 
potential of their use. (EASA, 2016; Sándor, 2017) This 
predicted increase may be promoted further by the fact 
that technological advances are becoming less expensive 
which allows the price of these devices to decrease.
Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs), on the basis of 
the definition of the ICAO Annex 2 (ICAO, 2005) and 
national laws like the Hungarian legislation, Act XCVII 
of 1995 on aviation, are considered as aircraft. Currently, 
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has defined 
rules only for UAVs with an operating mass above 150 kg. 
Below that weight, UAVs are under Member State com-
petence. At present, the Hungarian legal system has not 
yet established any regulation applicable under the 150 kg 
weight limit, but one is currently being developed. This 
Hungarian case well represents the problem that within 
Member states regulations do not apply a consistent 
approach or even they do not have any adopted rules for 
light UAVs (EASA, 2017).
With the purpose of the common, harmonized Europe-
wide regulations, on behalf of the European Commission, 
EASA has started to develop the EU-wide legislative 
framework for unmanned aircraft with an operating mass 
under 150 kg.
The priority of the European Commission’s aviation 
policy is to ensure aviation safety with directives and 
regulations (EESC, 2016). Hence, they have declared 
the aim of the integration of unmanned aircraft into the 
existing forms of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
system while maintaining the high level of safety (Van 
Eekeren et al., 2017). All this must be done in a way, 
without jeopardizing the manned aviation but yet provides 
a possibility for further development in the UAVs sector. 
(EQSC, 2014)
The integration of civilian UAVs into non-segregated 
airspace (Fig. 1) is precluded by the fact that current air 
traffic service systems are designed for conventional 
manned aircraft and those systems are not capable to deal 
with these new types of air vehicles.
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This is especially true of civil air surveillance systems. 
The civil surveillance sensors used today are not capable 
to detect the UAVs which means that they are invisible to 
the air traffic services.
The aim of this paper is to explain the reasons for this 
and also to explore potential solutions. For that purpose, 
an overview of UAVs and current surveillance sensors 
(Section 2) are provided. In Section 3, the previous find-
ings, the use of alternative methods for UAVs detection are 
proposed and evaluated in Section 4 using the criteria estab-
lished by the authors. Finally, in Section 5 the conclusions 
are drawn and future research directions are summarized.
2 Methodology
In this section the UAVs and the current civilian air traf-
fic surveillance are described. Depending on their type 
and purpose, several terms exist for the aircraft flying 
without pilot onboard. The most comprehensive term is 
the Unmanned Airborne System (UAS), which includes 
both pre-programmed, fully autonomous devices and 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). Initially, 
there was a distinction between RPAS and UAS. UAS 
originally referred to unmanned aircraft which are used 
for military applications. But they are no longer used only 
for military purposes but also for commercial and civil-
ian applications. Therefore, the distinction between the 
two terms is no longer valid and as a result, the term UAS 
may also apply to unmanned civilian aircraft. Both defi-
nitions comprise the entire system required to operate the 
aircraft shown by Fig. 2.
Please note abbreviations used on Fig. 2 are:
• the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft (RPA) itself,
• the control station or the Remote Pilot Station (RPS), 
from where the aircraft is operated by,
• the human operator called Remote Pilot (RP), and 
• the data link, which is called: Command and Control 
(C2) link.
Another small difference between the RPAS and the 
UAS terminology is that UAS term includes the possibil-
ity that a UAV could be operated in an autonomous mode, 
without requiring an active C2 connection with the sta-
tion. Whereas, a continuous C2 link is required for RPA 
operation which is unable to fly autonomously. An auton-
omous UAV is defined as a fully automated pilotless air-
craft, which flies a pre-programmed flight path relying on 
the information collected by its own sensors.
The aforementioned aircraft are known informally as 
drones in everyday speech. Since we are focusing on the 
detection of an unmanned aircraft, which is independent of 
its control, the UAV terminology will be applied in this paper.
2.1 Description of UAVs
The markets offer a wide range of UAVs in term of size, 
performance etc. As a result, they have a wide range of 
potential applications. As their features differ from tradi-
tional aircraft to which the surveillance systems have to 
adapt, hereinafter we make an overview of these specific 
features, which is demonstrated by Fig. 2.
Based on the type of aerial platform:
• vertical take-off and landing capable rotary wing 
aircraft, and 
• fixed-wing aircraft for longer flight duration.
Based on their propulsion systems:
• electric propulsion systems,
• fuel propulsion systems.
Almost exclusively, electric UAVs are used for civilian 
purposes for which the battery ensures the power needed 
Fig. 2 Elements of an UAS/RPAS
Fig. 1 Air space structure
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for their operation. The operating time of UAVs is deter-





Note, that improvement in the battery’s specific energy 
(kWh/kg) may result in the further advancement of UAVs.
Type of control:
• remotely controlled,
• fully automated pilotless aircraft, which flies a 
pre-programmed flight path with the support of their 
sensors like GPS and 
• mixed.
The non-autonomous UAVs typically use the 2.4-
2.5 GHz and 5.725-5.875 GHz for remote control, 
which frequency bands are not subject to authorization. 
Autonomous UAVs are controlled by GPS signals or their 
inertial system manage along their predefined path (Fig. 3).
UAVs exist across a wide range of sizes go from very sim-
ple, lightweight drones even to conventional aircraft-sized 
military purposed systems. In addition to their size, their 
flight range can be also variable. Along these two flight char-
acteristics, the Unmanned Vehicle Systems International 
(UVSI) made a classification, which is presented in Table 1.
2.2 Overview of the current civilian air traffic 
surveillance
The identification of the airborne aircraft and knowing 
their position are the most crucial information for the air 
navigation service provider (ANSP) to ensure safe separa-
tion between aircraft at all time. This information is pro-
vided to the air traffic controllers through the air traffic 
surveillance chain via the ATM system. The relationships 
between the elements forming the surveillance chain are 
illustrated in Fig. 4. More detailed information is described 
in Károly et al. (2017).
Since the airborne transponder and the ground sur-
veillance sensor system can be considered as the first ele-
ments of the whole surveillance chain, their capabilities 
fundamentally determine the information that is available. 
Therefore, in our research presented in this article, we have 
taken only the transponder and the sensors into account.
Among the civil air surveillance sensors used today, we 
can distinguish between non-cooperative (passive or pri-
mary) and cooperative (also known as active or secondary) 
systems depending on their working principle. 
The passive sensors’ position determination does not 
require any link with the aircraft whereas, for the active 
sensors’ operation on each aircraft, onboard transpon-
der (transmitting responder) is indispensable. Civil air 
traffic control uses both active and passive surveillance 
sensors complementing each other. Fig. 5 illustrates their 
classification.
Table 1 Classification of the UAVs by their physical features
Long Endurance Maximum take of weight (kg) Range (km) Max Flight Altitude (m) Endurance (hours)
Nano <0.025 <1 100 <1
Micro <5 <10 250 1
Mini <30 <10 150–300 <2
Close Range 150 10–30 3000 2–4
Short Range 200 30–70 3000 3–6
Medium Range 150–500 70–200 3000-5000 6–10
Medium Range x 500–1500 >500 5000–8000 10–18
Low Altitude x <30 >500 3000 >24
Medium Altitude x 1000–1500 >500 14 000 24–48
High Altitude x 2500–12 500 >2000 15 000–20 000 24–48
Fig. 3 Classification of the UAVs by their type of their control
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2.2.1 Passive Surveillance
Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) is of paramount impor-
tance, as since the 1940s (Bhatta and Geethapriya, 2016), 
the PSR means the only surveillance form that does not 
require any cooperation from the airborne aircraft. 
Air traffic surveillance radars such TAR, or en-route 
radars using S (2.7 to 2.9 GHz) and L (1 to 2 GHz) fre-
quency bands for medium to long range airspace cover-
age. Their rotating antennas transmit signals with high 
power, broad bandwidth which are suitable for detecting 
the conventional, commercial manned aircraft as these 
signals are reflected from the aircraft surface. Using that 
reflected radio pulse, it is able to provide basic, but essen-
tial range and bearing information about the position of 
an aircraft in relation to the radar.
PSRs measure this direction, bearing and also the tim-
ing and intensity, etc. of the reflected radio waves. The per-
formance is influenced by many factors, such as weather, 
noise. The main determinant factor one of all is the Radar 
Cross Section (RCS). Radar cross-section (RCS) is a mea-
sure of how detectable an object is by radar (Bothra et al., 
2017). An object reflects a limited amount of radar energy 
back to the source. Many factors have an influence on 
RCS, such like:
• the material of which the target is made,
• the absolute size of the target.
PSR does not provide with the elevation, identity or 
detailed position information of the aircraft, meaning it 
only ensures an elementary picture for air traffic controllers 
(ATCOs). In order to control the air traffic properly, ATCOs 
require more advanced data which is provided by the sec-
ondary surveillance systems, detailed in the next section.
However, behind PSRs outstanding importance is lay-
ing the fact that the detection is guaranteed in case of tran-
sponder failure or any unlawful acts.
Beside of PSRs, we have to mention the Multi Static 
Primary Surveillance Radar (MSPSR) which system is not 
yet operational, it is only in experimental phase but grow-
ing number of research deals with that like NATS Project 
EVA and Cabalkova et al. (2014). Their results confirmed 
that MSPSR could serve as an alternative to PSRs.
For the position measurement of an aircraft, MSPSR 
uses the existing telecommunications and terrestrial 
broadcasting signal. 
The key benefit of MSPSR over conventional PSR is 
the potential of reduced operating costs, especially where 
the system exploits non-conventional third-party trans-
missions such as the TV signals we’ve been using. More 
detailed description of this technology is provided in 
Section 3.2.
2.2.2 Active Surveillance
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) is the most widely used 
active sensor system. As it is a cooperative system, having a 
transponder onboard is an indispensable condition. Thus, all 
aircraft operating within controlled or special rules airspace 
must be equipped with an operational transponder.
The transponder receives and decodes the ground 
interrogator 1030 MHz pulse signal and responds using 
a 1090 MHz frequency. The response contains informa-
tion about the aircraft such as the identification (Mode A) 
Fig. 5 Surveillance sensors classification
Fig. 4 Elements of the surveillance chain
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and barometric altitude (Mode C). Besides this informa-
tion, the SSR radar calculates the position of the aircraft. 
As Károly et al. (2017) reviewed, the latest SSRs systems, 
called Mode S MSSRs, are able to selectively interrogate a 
particular aircraft and use the unambiguous identification 
code and other downloaded aircraft parameters.
More advanced technology and an entirely differ-
ent position determination are used by the Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). Namely, the 
ADS-B uses the aircraft position data determined by the 
onboard GPS system, and not by the ground system. This 
GPS data is automatically transmitted by the transpon-
der, and also contains the position, identification, both 
barometric and geometric altitudes, velocity, heading and 
some additional information.
This information is not only received by ground-based 
sensors, but it is also available to any aircraft equipped 
with a suitable transponder, for displaying the informa-
tion onboard. An ADS-B capable transponder is man-
datorily to be installed by 2020 for every aircraft above 
5700 kg maximum take-off weight operating in Europe. 
(Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/386).
ADS-B has two parts:
• ADS-B Out and
• ADS-B In.
ADS-B Out is the equipment that transmits the 
1090 MHz signals generating the data content men-
tioned above. ADS-B In is the equipment which is able 
to receive the 1090 MHz signal from the surrounding 
area and provide traffic information (situation aware-
ness) to the pilot.
In addition to the direct benefits for pilots, ANSPs could 
also take advantage of ADS-B. One of the main reason 
for installing and using ADS-B sensors in comparison to 
(M)SSRs is that ANSPs could expect medium-, long-term 
economic benefits as the ground ADS-B sensors mean 
less hardware and maintenance costs. Moreover, it is also 
capable of providing surveillance coverage in airspaces 
that are insufficiently covered by radar. 
3 Results
Unfortunately, UAVs cannot be detected by either passive 
or active surveillance sensors described in the previous 
section. Therefore, in our research, we focused to investi-
gate the reasons behind that, in addition alternative solu-
tions were proposed and assessed.
3.1 Assessment of the passive UAVs surveillance 
possibilities
Since the physical parameters used for the design of civil 
PSRs used today are targeting the traditional manned air-
craft, the UAVs do not mean an effective reflecting surface 
for them either in size or in materially. In this case, PSRs 
are not suitable for the UAVs detection. This fact means 
that UAVs are practically invisible to the air traffic services.
Despite that, air traffic control service is increasingly 
relying on active surveillance provided data, the impor-
tance of UAVs passive surveillance is justified because of 
their ease of access. As UAVs could mean security threats 
posed by their unlawful or unintentional usage.
3.1.1 MSPSR
Although in today’s radar, the transmitter and receiver 
are collocated, using the same antenna to transmit and 
receive, if we go back in time to some of the very earliest 
radar experiments, the transmitter and receiver were geo-
graphically separated from each other. These were known 
as Passive Bistatic Radar, PBR) and Passive Coherent 
Location (PCL).
The Multi-Static Primary Surveillance Radar is built on 
this (same) bistatic solution. However, in contrast to PBR 
and PSR, it does not release any radio signal but exploits 
third-party transmissions such as telecommunication, like 
FM, GSM, DTV-B signals. MSPSR uses that these signals 
are reflected from an aircraft surface. 
During its operation, the receiver antenna receives both 
the direct transmitted and also the reflected signals from 
an UAV surface. At least the procession of four multi static 
data pairs like this, results in the target’s position.
For the use of air traffic surveillance purposes, it can be 
said to have a suitable radio tower coverage today, espe-
cially at low altitude levels.
The technology is still in the research phase, but there 
have been good results in several studies targeting UAVs 
surveillance (Cabalkova et al., 2014; Aldowesh et al., 2015). 
Aldowesh et al. (2015) research investigates especially 
UAV with very low RCS and their detection by MSPSR. 
The experiment shows that MSPSR systems are able to 
detect a hardly observable targets. The signal process-
ing chain was able to provide the necessary gain to detect 
barely observable target at a range of 1km.
This supports Cabalkova et al. (2014) research that 
MSPSR can enable not only the manned aircraft without 
active transponder but also the UAVs detection in the near 
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future. The technique may be more suitable for detecting 
UAVs, since the third-party broadcast signals used, concur 
with the lower altitude airspace used by the UAVs.
However, the currently available short (about 1 km) 
coverage range requires placing the receiver antennas 
densely in the area of airspace to be surveyed. This would 
result in large ground infrastructure investment and thus 
cost which in the end, have a negative impact on the imple-
mentation of the system.
3.1.2 Phased Array Radar
Another suitable solution for passive detection of UAVs 
may be the phase-array antenna system. Unlike conven-
tional radars, it uses a non-rotating antenna, which scans 
the airspace with a two-dimensional digital beam format.
Like the MSPSR, the concept of the phased array radar 
it is not new. The first phased array radar was developed 
at the time of the second world war, but these were really 
costly. Due to the development of computer technology 
and digital technology, their price has become signifi-
cantly more favorable for nowadays.
Thanks to this and other advantageous features, it is 
an increasingly promising passive surveillance solution. 
It has also positive judgments due to the lack of moving 
parts as earlier mentioned, so they are less prone to failure, 
unlike currently used radars.
However, since this is also largely a short range, it is not 
suitable for passive surveillance of large-scale airspaces, 
it is only possible to supervise only highly protected air-
space e.g. airfields and shooters.
3.2 Assessment of the active surveillance possibilities
To detect UAVs with any cooperative sensor, there is a 
need to equip them along the lines of the traditional air-
craft with transponder. However, due to their size, weight 
and the level of energy consumption, they are not suitable 
for placement on UAV. 
Alternative beacon is required that are adapted to 
the UAV’s specific properties described in Section 2. 




• low power consumption,
• certification,
• low airborne equipment cost,
• low ground infrastructure cost,
• (partly) compatibility with other airborne equipage 
from the text.
The equipment power consumption is very important 
for installations in battery powered UAV aircraft. Since, it 
has a direct impact on durability and battery size, weight 
and cost.
3.2.1 Application of ADS-B
There are a number of ideas revealed about UAVs detec-
tion could been solved ADS-B Out capable transponder 
which is smaller in size and in power consumption than 
manned aircraft’s version.
A large number of proposals have already been drawn 
upon equipping UAVs with ADS-B Out transponder which 
are much smaller in size and in the power consumption 
than the ones used in manned aircraft just like Pahsa et al. 
(2011), Guterres et al. (2016).
This would be an appropriate proposal as it would oper-
ate on the same 1090 MHz frequency used by a traditional 
aircraft. Using the same frequency means the system’s 
main advantage and at the same time its drawbacks as well.
The advantage of using 1090 MHz allows the various 
airspace users to be interoperable in the simplest possi-
ble way. As a result, UAVs could not only be displayed 
for ATCOs, but also for other aircraft, for those who are 
directly threatened.
The common use of the spectrum is at the same time a 
disadvantage of using the system. In this regard, Guterres 
et al. (2016) have conducted a research. In their study, they 
simulated the anticipated UAVs traffic, which operates on 
the other ADS-B frequency (987 MHz frequency) used in 
the United States for the lower level operations of the gen-
eral aviation. Their research revealed that as the number of 
UAVs in the airspace increases, with the common frequency, 
the detection probability decreases. Although Guterres et 
al. (2016) assessed the 987 MHz frequency, a similar result 
can be expected for the 1090 MHz frequency. Thus assum-
ing that, all anticipated UAVs in the future would provide 
location information at 1090 MHz in addition to traditional 
aircraft, there may be a risk of frequency saturation.
The saturation of the frequency channel is less threat 
for UAVs rather than for the manned aircraft and means 
aviation safety issue. Since the reliance on the 1090 MHz 
is so significant, that in case of their saturation and as its 
consequence, the lack of the secondary surveillance infor-
mation, the civil air traffic management partly or wholly 
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would be impossible in certain regions of Europe. This 
would mean unforeseeable risks from the aviation safety 
point of view, as only primary detection data would be 
available to ATCOs. In today’s air traffic volume, the lack 
of secondary information would induce a very high work-
load and risk to the ATCOs. Therefore, the protection of 
the 1090 MHz frequency band is a key aspect.
We, therefore, consider the idea of equipping with an 
ADS-B Out transponder all the UAVs to be integrated, 
does not pose an appropriate solution. So, we propose to 
delineate clearly the UAVs which are most needed to be 
directly interoperable with manned aircraft and equipping 
exclusively them with ADS-B Out.
3.2.2 FLARM
Being undetectable is not only a problem for the new UAV, 
but the majority of the sport aircraft and gliders are almost 
invisible to air traffic control and to each other as well. The 
reason for the lack of onboard equipment is to be sought in 
power supply and cost problems as same as in UAVs case.
Recognizing the problem of these aircraft, several 
alternatives have been developed, which prices are much 
lower than the normal aircraft’s transponder, as for exam-
ple the so-called FLARM and its advanced version, called 
PowerFLARM, and OGN tracker onboard beacon. These 
equipment use the license-free 868.2-868.4 MHz band, 
which signals can be received and monitored via the 
ground-based Open Glider Network (OGN).
FLARM and PowerFLARM are small, low-power 
radio devices. Basically, they are collision warning sys-
tems that with a use of their own integrated GPS sensor, 
can broadcast their own position and velocity vector. At 
the same time, they also warn of possible short-term con-
flicts. The more advanced PowerFLARM is capable to 
process not only the signals on 868.2-868.4 MHz band, 
but also the Mode A, C, S and ADS-B signals. Therefore, 
the PowerFLARM enables (one-sided) compatibility with 
conventional aircraft. Any of the FLARM equipment, 
even under the current equipage conditions, could be rel-
evant near high sport aircraft and gliders traffic area.
3.2.3 Mobile network based surveillance
Since UAV is a new type of the participants in the air traf-
fic, it is also crucial to consider solutions that were not 
present in the aviation industry before. One of these solu-
tions is mobile network based positioning and tracking, 
Takács (2008) provides an overview about the variety of 
this possible method of surveillance.
Based on the mobile network, the cooperative surveil-
lance of the UAVs can be achieved/realized in a simple 
and cost-effective way. In order to establish this sort of 
control, it is necessary to install a GSM/LTE modem on 
the UAVs with, which weight is much more favorable than 
transponders. The inserted SIM card in the modem allows 
continuous GSM based positioning and the position infor-
mation’s transmission. Furthermore, thus the vehicle’s 
identification is also solved. The required communication 
infrastructure for this solution can be provided by tele-
communications operators.
The technology’s great advantage is that it does not 
use the air traffic frequencies, but operates on an inde-
pendent channel, without saturating frequency bands and 
compromising air traffic safety. However, it is important 
to emphasize the need for the adequate adaptation of tech-
nology for the data provided on the mobile network to be 
applicable for aviation purposes.
Nevertheless, the mobile network can be useful not only 
for surveillance purposes but for even the entire UAV traf-
fic management (UTM) can be realized using mobile tech-
nology. According to the writer’s opinion, it could mean 
that the GSM/LTE modem will be a basic equipment on 
certain UAVs in the future.
3.3 Definition and assessment of the semi-passive 
surveillance possibilities
In addition to the categories of active and passive systems 
presented earlier, we propose to distinguish semi-passive 
surveillance systems as a separate group. The literature clas-
sifies such systems into the passive category, but we do con-
sider essential to emphasize their operational differences to 
passive devices with the separate grouping (Fig. 6).
Since the operation of semi-passive systems is not 
based on the transmission of ground infrastructure, but it 
Fig. 6 Extended surveillance sensors classification
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uses the active broadcasts that are involved with the oper-
ation of the target, to detect it.
The following solutions are in the semi-passive class:
• acoustic surveillance,
• radio-frequency surveillance.
Military applications have still using them these days, 
to some extent. In civil applications, they are re-employed 
as a possible solution for UAVs detection.
3.3.1 Acoustic surveillance
Acoustic surveillance detects the presence, the direction, 
and the frequency of the acoustic vibrations in the free 
space. The moving elements of the UAVs generate noises 
and vibrations. Acoustic reconnaissance systems detect 
these by sensing sound waves generated by UAVs. It has 
the advantage that it can be used under poor visibility, but 
the propagation conditions, a noisy environment adversely 
affect its operation. Furthermore, it can only detect within 
a short range (<1 km).
3.3.2 Radio-frequency surveillance
For the radio-frequency surveillance, the ground-based 
system does not transmit any kind of signal that would 
induce the target to response or that reflects from the targets 
surface, but the system takes advantage of the signals 
emitted accompanying to their operation. In the literature, 
this technology is known as an Emitter Locating System 
(ELC). Initially, they were only used for military defence 
purposes. Today, however, with the widespread of UAVs 
that are hardly producing reflection, it came to the fore in 
the civil application, too. Its operation is based on the fact 
that the – not-autonomous- UAVs transmits regularly radio 
signals such as the C2 connection related communication 
- which is essential for non-autonomous UAVs, as C2 
provides the connection to/with their ground control.
To this C2 connection, most commonly the 2.4 GHz and 
5.8 GHz frequency signals are used. By monitoring these 
frequency bands, the majority of the UAVs surveillance 
can be ensured, taking advantage of the existing active 
transmission.
However, its applicability is limited: its detection range 
is greatly restricted and influenced by terrain and local 
characteristics. Therefore, it can be generally said that the 
operational area of the system is about 1 km.
4 Analysis
As a conclusion of the Section 2, the authors identified the 
following restrictive factors for UAVs which are essentials 
to be taken into account in the analysis:
• their size,
• their payload,
• power supply demand.
Based on them Table 2 evaluates the proposed pas-
sive UAV surveillance systems in relation to the revealed 
restrictive UAV factors
Even the increasingly promising passive surveillance 
solutions such as the MSPSR or the Phased Array Radar 
cannot cover large areas, therefore we concluded that the 
passive systems could be only used for highly protected 
airspace surveillance e.g. airfields. 
What the active UAV surveillance possibilities regard, 
Table 3 evaluates revealed restrictive factors of UAVs.
Although, many research papers suggested the use of 
the usage of the ADS-B Out equipment on UAVs, our eval-
uation highlighted the drawbacks that it could cause. We, 
therefore, consider this idea, to apply to all the UAVs to be 
integrated, does not pose an appropriate solution. So, we 
recommend to delineate clearly that the UAVs which are 
most needed to be directly interoperable with manned air-
craft should be equipped with ADS-B Out.
Table 2 Passive surveillance systems from the restrictive factors 
perspectives
Range Price Infrastructural needs
Detection of 
autonomous UAV
MSPSR 1 km +++ ++ yes
Phased 
array radar 8 km ++ ++ yes
Table 3 Active surveillance systems from the restrictive factors perspectives
Price Size, Weight Power consumption Standardization
Compatibility with 
transponder
1090 MHz frequency 
interference
ADS-B Out +++ + ++ partly ++ yes
FLARM ++ + + partly + no
OGN + + + no - no
GSM + + + no - no
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As the frequency, affordability, the physical features 
regards, the LTE/5G could be one of the best solution for 
UAVs. This technology could be not only useful for sur-
veillance purposes but also could have a bigger role in the 
future of unmanned traffic management. Its only draw-
backs, that it is not interoperable with the manned avia-
tion transponders.
We concluded a similar result with the proposed new 
category: semi-passive surveillance solutions that are 
shown by Table 4.
It can be said, that the semi-passive solution takes 
advantage of the unique features of UAVs such as the 2.4 
/ 5.8 GHz data connection. However, the detection range 
of these systems makes only feasible to be used as a lim-
ited, local solution.
From these results, it appears that the technology 
already serves with several solutions. Nevertheless, to 
their application, the lack of standardization means as 
one of the most significant barrier factors. Therefore, to 
exploit the potential of the low coast beacons, maturing 
the applicable standards is required, which providing a 
clear, identical operating framework for these pieces of 
equipment.
However, it is important to consider the fact that any 
alternative transponder placed on the UAVs means addi-
tional cost which imposing a barrier to the secondary 
surveillance of the UAVs. In addition to that, the power 
supply of the transponder could also mean a challenge, 
since the onboard equipment would require extra energy 
capacity.
For smaller UAVs, where the encoder’s size, weight, 
current consumption, and last but not least the cost of the 
encoder, does not always make it probable that the oper-
ators would be willing to equip there UAVs with beacon 
system.
Especially given the fact that they are obliged to pur-
chase a device that has a negative impact on the operating 
parameters and performance indicators of their devices, 
what is more, the functions of those devices are only 
important for air traffic control.
5 Conclusion
The future aviation environment will be extremely chal-
lenging from the surveillance infrastructure perspective: 
it will have to cope with the growth of the UAVs and have 
to support their safely integration into the current air traf-
fic system.
As the first step of our present research, the problem of 
the UAVs was highlighted from the ATM and the surveil-
lance perspective. To that for a grounded solution proposal, 
we consider substantial to provide a complete understand-
ing of the UAVs physical features, which have the main 
effects on their detectability. The key factors were iden-
tified that was essential to the further holistic evaluation.
Then, we presented an overview of the civil air traffic 
surveillance sensors used today and discussed why they 
are not capable to detect the UAVs.
Based on the conclusion of the previous chapters, 
we made the proposals for the use of alternative techni-
cal solutions. These solutions were assessed through the 
revealed key factors. 
From our research, it appears that the technology 
already serves with several solutions. Nevertheless, to 
their application, the lack of standardization means as one 
of the most significant barrier factors.
The research we proceed revealed that there is no one per-
fect solution, which accommodate all stakeholders needs. 
Therefore, to facilitate all the different needs (e.g. cooper-
ative or non-cooperative), it should be combined the differ-
ent technologies along an interoperable framework.
The potential of the research field is significant. and a 
growing issue, therefore, to continue the presented find-
ings: further research can be 
• to reveal who are the affected parties concerned with 
the drone surveillance issues,
• to determine the interoperability requirements for 
UAV onboard devices,
• to identify the functions associated with airspace 
surveillance.
Based on these results, an integrated UAS surveillance 
concept can be formed.
Table 4 Semi-passive surveillance systems from the restrictive factors perspectives
Achievable coverage 
range Price Infrastructural needs
Detection of autonomous 
UAV
Acoustic surveillance 1 km +++ ++ yes
Radio-frequency surveillance 1 km +++ ++ yes
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